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Canadian v. American
Defamation Law: What Can We
Learn From Hyperlinks?
By Mitchell Drucker
Introduction
The United States and Canada, both former British colonies,
inherited the common law from their colonial forbearers.' The
evolution of that law in the respective judicial systems of these North
American neighbors has produced two systems that in some ways are
quite similar and in other ways are quite different.2 The law of
defamation is one area where the differences between the current
jurisprudence of the two countries are particularly pronounced.3
Generally, Canadian courts are known to be quite plaintiff-friendly in
defamation cases, 4 whereas American legislators have made a
concerted effort to ensure that U.S. courts' more defendant-friendly
laws are not thwarted by other countries.5 However, through a series
1.

Mark C. Miller, A Comparison of the Judicial Role in the United States and
in Canada,22 SUFFOLK TRASNAT'L L. REV. 1 (1998-1999).

2.

See, e.g., id.(discussing the countries' different approaches to judicial
decisionmaking); David Fraser and Alan Freeman, What's Hockey Got
To Do With It, Anyway? Comparative Canadian-American Perspectives on
Constitutional Law and Rights, 36 BUFF. L. REV.
259 (1987)
(examining the "political, cultural and ideological differences" behind
the two countries' constitutional systems).

3.

See e.g., Charles Tingley, Reputation, Freedom of Expression and the Tort
of Defamation in the United States and Canada: A Deceptive Polarity,
37 ALTA. L. REV. 620, 622 (1999) ("the Supreme Court of Canada
has explicitly refused to follow the American lead in the libel context.")

4.

See e.g., Dan Burnett, Canada should reform its antiquated libel laws,
LAWYERS WKLY., Oct. 27, 2006, 12-13 (claiming that Canadian "libel
laws are the least protective of free speech in the English-speaking
world"); Dean Jobb, Responsible Communication on Matters of Public
Interest: A New Defense Updates Canada's Defamation Laws, 3 J. INT'L
MEDIA & ENT. L. 195, 198 (2010-2011) ("This feature of Canada's libel
laws-a low threshold for establishing defamation, coupled with shifting
the burden from the accuser to the defendant-has been criticized as
making Canada's libel laws, like Britain's, too plaintiff-friendly.")

5.

See U.S. Legislation Blocks Enforcement of "Libel Tourism " Judgments,
104 AM. J. INT'L L. 681 (2010). For a more comprehensive discussion of
these U.S. legislative efforts, culminating in the SPEECH Act of 2010,
see Marissa Gemy, The SPEECH Act Defends the First Amendment: A
Visible and Targeted Response to Libel Tourism, 36 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 409, 432-43 (2011). However, it has also been argued that
these efforts were an overreaction because the practical application of

of decisions in the past five years, the Supreme Court of Canada
(SCC) has drastically altered Canada's defamation jurisprudence to
give defendants some new defences. 6 Nevertheless, the fundamentals of
defamation law in the U.S. and Canada remain quite different; in fact,
one of those recent SCC decisions characterized U.S. defamation law
as an "extreme[]" among the laws of western countries, and envisioned
Canada's path as avoiding that extreme by pursuing a "middle
road."7

In both countries, traditional defamation law has been forced to
adapt to the advent of the internet and the proliferation of online
communications! This note will explore one particular aspect of the
two countries' internet defamation jurisprudence that, on first glance,
appears to be a close similarity. Specifically, the treatment of
hyperlinks in the defamation context in Canada and the U.S. in two
recent cases appeared to be identical: courts in both countries refused
to hold a defendant liable for publishing a hyperlink to defamatory
content on a website. However, a comparative analysis of the two
opinions illustrates that the SCC's use of American precedents in
reaching its decision actually symbolizes the wide divergence between
the two countries on the legal treatment of republication.
This note will first provide, in turn, overviews of both American
and Canadian defamation law and will highlight their traditionally
different approaches to the issue of republication. In the U.S.,
defamation defendants in the majority of jurisdictions have been
protected by the "single publication rule," 9 whereas Canadian
defendants are subjected to the, albeit somewhat limited, "multiple

U.S. and foreign defamation laws had recently converged. See Harry
Melkonian, DEFAMATION, LIBEL TOURISM, AND THE SPEECH ACT
OF 2010 52-66, 241-73 (2011).
6.

See e.g., Jamie Cameron, Does Section 2(b) Really Make a Difference?
Part 1: Freedom of Expression, Defamation Law and the Journalist-Source
Privilege, 51 S.C. L. REV. 133, 133-37 (2010).

7.

Grant v. Toronto Star Newspapers, Ltd.,
(Can.).

8.

For consideration of this phenomenon in the Canadian context, see
generally Robert Danay, The Medium is Not the Message: Reconciling
Reputation and Free Expression in Cases of Internet Defamation, 56
MCGILL L. J. 1 (2010); Teresa Scassa and Michael Deturbide,
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW IN CANADA
415-23
(2004). For the American context, see generally Bruce W. Sanford and
Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching An Old Dog New Tricks: The First
Amendment In An Online World, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1137 (1995-96);
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000).

9.

See SACK ON DEFAMATION §7:2.1 (2012).

[2009] S.C.R.

64, para.

85

publication rule."' Subsequently, this note will examine recent cases
that have emerged from both countries in which the use of hyperlinks
is considered in the context of defamation suits. In the U.S., the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed the issue in In Re:
(hereinafter Newspapers) while the
PhiladelphiaNewspapers, LLC,"
Supreme Court of Canada tackled it head on in Crookes v. Newton."
Both courts rejected the notion that the sole act of hyperlinking to
defamatory content constituted the publication or republication of
defamatory content. The Third Circuit explicitly justified its holding
as the simple application of the single publication rule to the online
world, and the SCC relied on American cases to hold that hyperlinks
do not constitute republication of defamatory material. However, this
note will argue that the way in which the SCC's opinion in Crookes
actually emphasizes the difference
utilized American jurisprudence
between the American single publication rule and the Canadian
adherence to the multiple publication rule.
I. The Current State of Defamation Law and How We
Got There
This section will provide overviews of defamation law in both the
U.S. and Canada by briefly discussing defamation's historical
development and the key decisions that have shaped its modem form.
While a full discussion of each nation's defamation jurisprudence is
beyond the scope of this note, this section's purpose is to discuss the
general contours of defamation law in each country with a focus on
how courts in each country treat the issue of republication.
A. American DefamationLaw
The current shape of defamation law in the U.S. owes its form to
a series of now famous Supreme Court opinions that began with New
York Times v. Sullivan 3 that collectively defines the constitutional
However, prior to Sullivan, defamation
standards for defamation.
jurisprudence in the U.S. had been shaped solely by the common law
and legislative enactments; it had not yet been impacted by the First
Amendment. 4 In fact, in 1909 the United States Supreme Court
10.

Raymond E. Brown,

THE LAW OF DEFAMATION IN CANADA 7.12(6)(a)

(2d ed. 1987) (loose-leaf).
11.

690 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2012).

12.

[2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 (Can.).

13.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

14.

See Youm, Kyu Ho, Suing American Media in Foreign Courts: Doing an

End-Run Around U.S. Libel Law?, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
235, 239 (1993-94) (explainingthat "[p]rior to the 1964 U.S. Supreme
Court decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which revolutionized

refused to impose First Amendment restrictions on defamation when
it upheld the common law rule of strict liability for libel suits, 5 and it
reaffirmed that refusal four more times before Sullivan.6 Moreover,
U.S. defamation law prior to 1964 differed from state to state. 7 Most
states operated under the principle of strict liability, with each state
then supplying its own variations. 8 Courts generally presumed that
any defamatory statements were false, placing the burden on the
defendant to prove their truth as a defense. 19 In addition to truth, the
qualified privilege of fair comment offered the other primary defense."0
In 1964, the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Sullivan
constitutionalized the law of defamation,"' drastically altering the

American libel law, American libel law was, in essence, identical to the
English common law of libel."); see also James C. Goodale, Centuries of
Libel Law Erased by Times-Sullivan, 191 N.Y.L.J. 49 (1984) reprintedin
NEW

YORK

TIMES V. SULLIVAN,

THE

NEXT TWENTY YEARS

528 (R.

Winfield ed. 1984); Douglas A. Alderson, The Constitutionalizationof
Defamation: American and Canadian Approaches to the Constitutional
Regulation of Speech, 15 ADOCS'. Q. 386, 386 (1993).
15. SeePeck v.Tribune, 214 U.S. 185, 189 (1909). In reaching itsopinion,
the Court explicitly referred to the work of prominent British judge
Lord Mansfield:
As was said of such matters by Lord Mansfield, 'Whenever a
man publishes, he publishes at his peril.' The reason is plain. A
libel is harmful on its face. If a man sees fit to publish
manifestly hurtful statements concerning an individual, without
other justification than exists for an advertisement or a piece of
news, the usual principles of tort will make him liable if the
statements are false, or are true only of someone else.
16. See Goodale, supra note 14, at 526 ("the Court repeatedly noted in
dictum that the Constitution offered no protection to libel
defendants."). In making that claim, Goodale is referring to Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 34849 (1946); Chapinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); and
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48 (1961).
17. Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. and beyond:'An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV.
1349, 1350 (1975).

18.

Sack on Defamation §1:2.1 (2012).
19. Id.at §1:7.
20. See Goodale, supra note 14, at 525. Goodale explains fair comment as
meaning that publishers "were free to print defamatory opinions about
matters of 'public interest' and 'public concern' so long as those opinions
did not make or imply any false assertions of fact." Id.; see also SACK
ON DEFAMATION

21.

§4:4.

See Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)

("libel can claim no talismanic

immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by
standards that satisfy the First Amendment.").

landscape of the country's defamation jurisprudence.22 The Sullivan
Court held that:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a
federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not.23
The Court justified its holding by noting that the protection of the
all-important democratic principle of free expression necessitates the
allowance of "unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."24
The actual malice standard requires defamation plaintiffs to show
that the defendant subjectively knew or had significant doubt that
the published statements were false.25 Absent that showing, a
defamation plaintiff cannot recover. A decade after Sullivan, the
Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 6 clarified that the actual malice
standard applies when the plaintiff is a public official or a public
figure,27 but does not apply when the plaintiff is a private figure.28 To
recover actual damages, private figure plaintiffs need only show some
level of fault to be determined by the individual states.29 However,
Gertz also established that, regardless of the plaintiff's status, "the
States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at
least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard for the truth."30 Therefore, to receive the more
lucrative awards that presumed or punitive damages could provide,
even private plaintiffs need to show actual malice. In practice, it
22.

See Eaton, supra note 17, at 1367-69.

23.

Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).

24.

Id. at 270.

25.

St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)

(holding that to find

actual malice "[t]here must be sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless
disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.").
26.

418 U.S. 323 (1974).

27.

As established in Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).

28.

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-46.

29.

Id. at 347 (holding that "so long as they do not impose liability without
fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious
to a private individual.").

30.

Id. at 349.

seems that after Sullivan and Gertz, the vast majority of defamation
plaintiffs, regardless of private/public status, are faced with the
burden of proving actual malice.'
Since Sullivan and Gertz, most U.S. defamation jurisprudence has
emerged from state courts and lower federal courts,32 with the
Supreme Court reaffirming the vitality of Sullivan in 1988 by applying
its actual malice standard to public figures' claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.33 However, the precise contours of each
state's defamation laws vary above the constitutional floor set by the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence. Generally, a defamation action must
contain five elements: (1) false statements of fact, (2) of and
concerning a person, (3) that are printed, broadcast, spoken or
otherwise published, (4) that are defamatory, and (5) made with some
degree of fault.34
B. CanadianDefamation Law
Defamation law in Canada is very similar to the status of
American defamation law prior to the shift that started with Sullivan
in 1964. When the SCC finally had occasion, in 1995, to address the
constitutionality of Canadian defamation law,35 it acknowledged that
historical vintage by recognizing that "[t]he character of the law
relating to libel and slander in the 20th century is essentially the
product of its historical development up to the 17th century. 3 6 In its
opinion in that case, Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, 7 the
31.

SeeDavid Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L.
REV.

32.
33.

487, 502 (1991-92).

See SACK ON DEFAMATION §1:2.6.
See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The Falwell
Court "conclude[d] that public figures and public officials may not
recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by
reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in
addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which
was made with 'actual malice."' The Falwell decision solidified Sullivan
by ensuring that the Court "would not permit states to avoid
constitutional safeguards by inventing new torts or by calling old ones
(libel, slander, or invasion of privacy) by new names, such as
'intentional infliction of emotional harm' or 'outrage."' SACK ON
DEFAMATION

34.

35.
36.
37.

§1:2.8.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558. The Restatement formulates the
number of elements in a slightly different way, but these elements are
nevertheless all present in the Restatement's version.
See Alderson, supra note 14, at 414 (writing, in 1993, that no SCC case
had yet presented the issue of defamation's constitutionality).
Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, para. 116
(Can.).
Id.

Court was forced to contemplate the appropriate course for the
judiciary in cases between private litigants that challenge the common
law as

violating

the

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

[hereinafter Charter]. The Court found that in such cases where no
governmental action was involved, then only Charter values, as
opposed to Charter rights, were at stake.38 The Hill Court ruled that
if a court finds that a challenged element of the common law is
inconsistent with Charter values, then it could be appropriate to
incrementally reform the common law by judicial decree.39
With that framework for Charteranalysis set out, the Court then
proceeded to examine the common law of defamation in light of the
Charter values that it implicates. The Court explained that
defamation cases inevitably force the balancing of the values of
reputation and freedom of expression.4" The value of free expression is
explicitly enshrined in Section 2(b) of the Charter,4' and the Court
explained that "[a]lthough it is not mentioned in the Charter, the
good reputation of the individual represents and reflects the innate
dignity 42of the individual, a concept which underlies all the Charter
rights.
In considering whether the state of the common law at that point
struck an appropriate balance between those values, the Court
rejected the actual malice standard 43 adopted by the U.S. in Sullivan
by citing to a litany of American academic articles and judicial
opinions that criticized the consequences and underlying rationale of
that standard. 4 Thus, Justice Cory, writing for the Court, went on to
38.

Id. at 94-95.

39.

Id. at 95-99.

40.

Id. at para. 100.

41.

The complete text of s.2 of the Charter is as follows:
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association.

42.

Hill, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, para. 120 (Can.). For a criticism of the Hill
opinion based in part on the grounds that the Court seemed to value
reputational interests more than expressive freedom despite the explicit
mention of freedom of expression in the Charter and the absence of an
explicit mention of reputation, see Cameron, supra note 6, at 137-40.

43.

Id. at para. 137 ("I can see no reason for adopting the [actual malice
standard] in Canada in an action between private litigants.")

44.

Id. at para. 127-31. The court also cited international courts and
academic pieces that criticized Sullivan. Id. at para. 133-36. However,

scholars have pointed out that the Court failed to consider the fact that
while the American articles disapproved of Sullivan for various reasons,

hold that "the common law of defamation complies with the
underlying values of the Charter and there is no need to amend or
alter it." 45 Following Hill, the status quo in Canadian defamation law
remained intact: the plaintiffs showing "that the words complained of
are: (i) capable of being defamatory; (ii) were published and (iii) refer
46
to the plaintiff' comes with a presumption of falsity and damages.
The defendant then carried the burden of proving truth, fair
comment, or privilege to escape liability. 47 While the Hill court
reached its decision satisfied that it appropriately balanced the two
values at stake, 48 commentators have skewered the Court for elevating
reputational interests over the freedom of expression.49
In 2008, the SCC in WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson ° updated
Canada's common law fair comment defence 5 by expanding it to
include statements of opinion made not just with an honest belief, but
52
also any opinion that could possibly be honestly held by any person.
As such, the Court moved the defence from a limited subjective
standard to a more expansive objective standard.53 In doing so, the
none of the articles advocated a return to the pre-Sullivan common law
standard. See June Ross, The Common Law of Defamation Fails to Enter
the Age of the Charter, 35 ALTA. L. REV. 117, 133-34. See also Denis W.
Boivin, Accommodating Freedom of Expression and Reputation in the
Common Law of Defamation, 22 QUEEN'S L.J. 229,
247 (1996-97) (noting the apparent oversight in Hill's criticism of
Sullivan to consider alternative reforms to the common law other than
actual malice).
45.

Hill, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, para. 141 (Can.).

46.

Richard Dearden & Wendy Wagner, Canadian Libel Law Enters the
21st Century: The Public Interest Responsible Communication Defence,
41 OTTAWA L. REV. 351, 354 (2009-10).

47.

At the time, these were the only defences available. But, as will be
explained in the remainder of this section, the SCC has since added
more defences to the toolkit of defamation defendants.

48.

Hill, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, para. 121 (writing that the values of
reputation and free expression are "equally important" and "must be
carefully balanced").

49.

See, e.g., Cameron, supra note 6, at 138 (2010) (arguing that Justice
Cory in Hill "marginalized the expressive activity at stake and enhanced
the status of reputation in the process"); Ross supra note 44, at 133
(claiming that "[t]he minimal value attributed to expression in Hill was
contrasted with the great value accorded to reputation").

50.

[2008] 2 S.C.R. 420 (Can.).

51.

See Cameron, supra note 6, at 141 (explaining that prior to WIC Radio,
newspaper defendants were forced to either adopt every opinion in a
letter to the editor that it published, or not publish the letter at all).

52.

WIC Radio, [2008] 2. S.C.R. 420, para. 28 (Can.).

53.

Cameron, supra note 6, at 142.

Court again noted that it must balance the individual's reputation
interest and the freedom of expression without establishing a
"'hierarchy' of rights. 54 However, this time, by expanding the
defence, the Court struck a balance slightly in favour of defamation
defendants. Importantly, the Court did not shift the burden of proof
in defamation cases, as the defendant still faces the presumption of
falsity and the requirement to prove the fair comment defence. 5
One year later, in the companion cases of Grant v. Torstar
Corp.56 and Quan v. Cusson," the SCC further enlarged the toolkit of
defences available to defamation defendants by adopting the defence
of "responsible communications on matters of public interest."5 8 To
successfully invoke this defence, the defendant must prove that (1)
the publication pertained to a matter of public interest;59 and (2) the
publisher followed a course of responsible communication.6" Noting
that "sometimes the public interest requires that untrue statements
the
immunity," 6'
the
Court recognized
should
be granted
shortcomings of its post-Hill jurisprudence 62 and sought to correct

54.

WIC Radio, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420, para. 2 (Can.).

55.

WIC Radio, [2008] 2. S.C.R. 420, para. 28 (Can.).

56.

[2009] 3 S.C.R. 640 (Can.).

57.

[2009] 3 S.C.R. 712 (Can.).

58.

Grant, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, para. 7 (Can.). The defence is based on the

"responsible journalism" defence adopted in the United Kingdom in
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1999] 4 All E.R. 609, but the SCC
noted that since the defence is available not just to journalists, but to
all publishers on matters related to the public interest, it is more
appropriate to call it "responsible communication on matters of public
interest." See Grant, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, para. 96-97.

59.

Id. at para. 126. The Court opted for a broad definition of public
interest, writing that the "[p]ublic interest is not confined to
publications on government and political matters[.] . . . The public has
a genuine stake in knowing about many matters, ranging from science
and the arts to the environment, religion and morality. The democratic
interest in such wideranging public debate must be reflected in the
jurisprudence." Id. at para. 106.

60.

Id. at para. 126. The Court provided a list of eight factors to be
considered when determining whether the publisher acted responsibly,
of "any other relevant
one of which is the open-ended factor
circumstances." See id.

61.

Id. at para. 55 (explaining that this requirement can be justified both by
"the importance of robust debate on matters of public interest" or by

"the importance of discussion and disclosure as a means of getting at the
truth.").
62.

Id. at para. 57 (acknowledging that "[i]t is simply beyond debate that
the limited defences available to press-related defendants may have the

effect of inhibiting political discourse and debate on matters of public

that without compromising the ability of plaintiffs to recover from
irresponsible publishers.
In the wake of this decision, the lawyers for the media defendant
in Cusson exclaimed that the establishment of the public interest in
responsible communication defence constitutes "a major advancement
for the freedom of speech in Canada."63 However, it remains to be
seen whether this recent shift in the jurisprudence will yield
significant benefit to future defamation defendants. 64 Even if the new
defence proves to be a boon to defendants, the strict liability nature
of defamation
in Canada remains heavily plaintiff-friendly when
compared to the fault requirement of the U.S.
C. America's Single PublicationRule v. Canada's Multiple Publication
Rule

Applied on their face, the five elements of defamation law in the
U.S. could render a defendant that published multiple editions of the
same publication (e.g. the publisher of a magazine with a circulation
of 500,000), liable to a plaintiff for a cause of action stemming from
each published copy. To prevent this unwieldy and undesirable
result,6 5 most U.S. jurisdictions

adhere to the single publication

rule,

which establishes that "[a]ny one edition of a book or newspaper, or
any one radio or television broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture
or similar aggregate communication is a single publication. 6 6 The
importance, and impeding the cut and thrust of discussion necessary to
discovery of the truth.").
63.

Dearden & Wagner, supra note 46, at 373. Dearden went even further in
an interview with the media by saying that had the SCC not taken the
steps it did in Grant and Cusson, then Canada's defamation
jurisprudence would still be "in the Dark ages." P. McGrath, Canada's
Supreme Court establishes new libel defence, THE NATIONAL POST, Dec.
23, 2009.

64.

See Cameron, supra note 6, at 148 (arguing that the responsible
communication defence does not go far enough because its second step is
designed to "make it as difficult as possible for [the defence] to
prevail.").

65.

See Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc. 422 N.Y.S.2d 552, 555, judgment
modified 73 A.D.2d 43 (1980), order affirmed 420 N.E.2d 377 (1981)
("The purpose of the rule is to prevent a multiplicity of unnecessarily
vexatious suits against a publisher, especially after a [publication] has
left the possession of the publisher, has been placed in the stream of
commerce and is exclusively under control of wholesale distributors and
retail outlets.").

66.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577A. A similar definition of the rule
can be found in Note,
The Single Publication Rule and Online
Copyright: Tensions Between Broadcast, Licensing, and Defamation Law,
123 HARV.
L. REV.
1315,
1317 (2010)
[hereinafter Tensions]
(quoting Van Buskirk v. N.Y. Times Co., 325 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir.
2003)) ("The rule provides that 'the publication of a single defamatory

statute of limitations for the defamation cause of action, which is
most commonly one year, begins to run at that time of publication.67
The statute of limitations will start over if republication occurs either
(a) to a new group (e.g. in the morning edition of a newspaper and
then again in the evening edition); or (b) to the same group but with
substantial modification to the content (e.g. revised second edition of
a book). In this fashion, the rule protects defendants from the
nuisances and complexities of multiple causes of action, but still
affords plaintiffs the ability to seek recovery for harm caused.68
Though the single publication rule was first developed in the
context of traditional print publications, it has since been applied to
progressively new mediums of expression, including the internet.69 For
instance, courts in jurisdictions with the single publication rule have
routinely held that the continued presence of an article online does
not cause an endless retriggering of the statute of limitations until the
article is taken down. 70 Rather, the statute of limitations begins to
run from the date that the article is first published online. 71 Similarly,
just as there was no new publication each time a purchaser bought a
copy of a book from a bookstore, there is no new publication each
time an online visitor accesses a webpage.72 As such, U.S. courts seem
item, such as a book or article, even if sold in multiple copies, and in
numerous places, at various times, gives rise to 'only one cause of action
which arises when the finished product is released by the publisher for
sale."'). See Tensions at 89 n.8, for a list of other cases that have
applied the similar or identical rule. It is important to note, however,
that though the multiple issues are treated as one publication for the
sake of the plaintiffs cause of action, the plaintiff can recover damages
resulting from all audiences that the
in that cause of action
communication has reached or will reach in the future. See Restatement
of Torts §577A Comment on Subsection (4).
67.

Tensions, supra note 66, at 1317.

68.

See Debra R. Cohen, The Single Publication Rule: One Action, Not One
Law, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 921, 924 (1996).

69.

See generally Lori A. Wood, Cyber-Defamation and the Single
Publication Rule, 81 B.U. L. REV. 895, 895-908 (2001).

70.

See, e.g., Firth v. State, 706 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 2000), aff'd 775
N.E.2d 463 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2002); Mitan v. Davis, 243 F.Supp.2d 719,
721-24 (W.D. Ky. 2003); McCandliss v. Cox Enters., 593 S.E.2d 856,
858 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Atkinson v. McLaughlin, 462 F.Supp.2d 1038,
1051-55 (D.N.D. 2006); Nationwide Bi-Weekly Admin., Inc. v. Belo
Corp., 512 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 2007); Oja v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
440 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2006); Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., 660 F.3d 1156,

1166-69 (9th Cir. 2011).
71.

See, e.g., Mitan, 243 F.Supp.2d at 724.

72.

See, e.g., Nationwide, 512 F.3d at 145. The court here explicitly
analogized access to a webpage to a store's maintenance of a stock of
books:

to be transplanting the protections offered by the single publication
rule into the online world.
In addition to the previously discussed aspects of Canadian
defamation law that make it more plaintiff-friendly than American
jurisprudence, Canada rejects the single publication rule in favour of
the multiple publication rule.73 In Canada, "each sale or delivery of a
single copy of a newspaper, magazine or book was a separate
publication for which the injured plaintiff had a distinct cause of
action."74 That version of the multiple publication rule was amended
slightly by the SCC in Thomson v. Lambert" where the Court
established that because "[tihere can be a potential injustice if a
plaintiff is allowed to mount a series of lawsuits based upon a single
article, [] the courts have the power using their abuse of process
jurisdiction to deal with such a course of action."76 As such, Canadian
courts do restrict the ability of plaintiffs to pursue multiple causes of
action against the same defendant based on the same publication."
However, the divergence between Canadian and American courts
on this issue manifests itself in the running of the statute of
limitations: in the U.S., the cause of action accrues from the time of
initial "publication," whereas in Canada, the statute of limitations is
refreshed with each new "publication."78 Thus, Canadian defamation
When a publisher continues to make an allegedly defamatory
book available from its stock, courts have held that action does
not constitute republication, even though the publisher could
have withdrawn the book. Likewise, the continued availability of
an article on a website should not result in republication, despite
the website's ability to remove it.
73.

See J.-G. Castel, Multistate Defamation: Should the Placeof Publication
Rule Be Abandonedfor Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Purposes, 28
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 153, 164 n.36 (noting that "[m]any states have
adopted a single publication rule in the United States. In Canada this is
not the case ...");
see also Brown, supra note 10, at 7.12(6)(b) 7-158 7-163 (describing and exploring the single publication rule as the
American rule that does not apply in Canadian courts).

74.

Brown, supra note 10, at 7.12(6)(a) (citing Lambert v. Roberts Drug
Stores Ltd. (1933) 41 Man. R. 322 (C.A.)). This rule is quite similar to
the Canadian rule on repetition: "[e]very repetition of a defamatory
statement is a new publication, for which a separate cause of action will
lie, even if the defendant is merely repeating or referring to what he or
she had said before." Brown, supra note 10, at 7.7.

75.

[1938] S.C.R. 253 (Can.).

76.

Carter v. B.C. Fed'n of Foster Parents Ass'n, 42 B.C.L.R. 4th 1 (Can.
B.C. C.A.) (citing Thomson v. Lambert, [1938] S.C.R. 253 (Can.)).

77.

Brown, supra note 10, at 7.12(6)(a).

78.

In this context, "publication" could be, inter alia, the sale of a book,
newspaper, or magazine, the broadcasting of a television or radio
program, or potentially a visit to a website.

plaintiffs will often have a significantly greater time within which they
can recover, whereas American defamation plaintiffs that remain idle
for too long will often be left with nothing. In Carter v. B.C. Fed'nn
of Foster Parents Ass 'n,79 the British Columbia Court of Appeals
explicitly contemplated the adoption of the single publication rule.
The court explained that while Canadian courts have not usually
decided directly on the single publication issue, the "clear tendency of
the authorities . . . is in favour of the English and Australian position
and not in favour of the American position."8 Noting that the
question of whether to judicially invoke the single publication rule has
"a considerable element of policy inherent in it,"'" the court declined
to follow the American rule absent direction from the legislature,
thereby affording Canadian defamation plaintiffs the luxury of the
perpetual restarting of the statute of limitations.82
II. Hyperlinks: A Newfound Convergence?
With an understanding of the fundamental differences between
American and Canadian defamation law, the proper framework is now
in place within which it is possible to appreciate the novelty of the
seemingly identical treatment given to hyperlinks in two recent
defamation cases. This section will examine each of those cases with
the aim of comprehending how the same general result was reached in
different
defamation
with
significantly
these
two countries
jurisprudence.
A. Hyperlinks in the U.S.: In Re: PhiladelphiaNewspapers
The defamation claim in the case of In Re: Philadelphia
Newspapers83 arose out of the bankruptcy proceedings of a corporate
79.

42 B.C.L.R. 4th 1 (Can. B.C. C.A.).

80.

Id. at para. 18. The court's refusal to adopt the single publication rule
here was supported by the SCC's 2012 ruling in Breeden v. Black, 2012
SCC 19, (Can.) in which the court, when ruling on a jurisdictional issue,
held that republication occurred each time online content was accessed.
Breeden, 2012 SCC 19 at para. 20.

81.

Carter, 42 B.C.L.R. 4th 1 at para. 20.

82.

Id. Explaining his reasoning, J. Hall wrote for the Court:
Although, for the reasons noted by the trial judge, legislatures
may have to come to grips with publication issues thrown up by
the new development of widespread internet publication, to date
the issue has not been legislatively addressed and in default of
that, I do not consider that it would be appropriate for this
Court to adopt the American rule over the rule that seems to be
generally accepted throughout the Commonwealth.

83.
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Philadelphia

Newspapers,

[hereinafter Newspapers].

690

F.3d

161

(3d

Cir.

2012)

group that includes The Philadelphia Inquirer newspaper.84 A charter
school group, known as CSMI, filed a tort action as an administrative
expense claim against the newspaper company.85 CSMI alleged that
the Inquirer defamed its school group by maintaining a webpage,
known as the Charter Page, which contained hyperlinks to allegedly
defamatory articles the Inquirer had written about the schools. 8 6 At
issue in this case was whether a post-petition editorial released online
by the Inquirer that endorsed the articles and linked to the Charter
Page "republished" the allegedly defamatory content that had initially
been published pre-petition.87
In order for an administrative expense tort claim to be viable, it
must be based on post-petition conduct.88 As such, the mere existence
of the pre-petition content would not suffice to support a claim.
However, if the hyperlink was found to have republished the article,
then the conduct occurred post-petition and the defamation action
could stand. Conversely, if the hyperlink did not constitute
republication, then the conduct occurred pre-petition and the
defamation action would be barred.
While this defamation action arose in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding, the elements of a traditional defamation claim still
applied.89 As such, the Third Circuit framed the question of
publication pre- or post-petition as a more familiar issue: was the
cause of action prohibited because it was based on conduct that
occurred at a time from which the statute of limitations has since
expired (pre-petition); or was it allowed because it was based on
conduct from which the statute of limitations had not yet expired
(post-petition).90 Thus, the court turned to traditional U.S. rules on
publication to determine whether the hyperlink was republished postpetition. The court noted that Pennsylvania follows the "single
publication rule," which proffers that "it is the original printing of the
defamatory material and not the circulation of it which results in a
cause of action."91 However, at the time of this federal appellate
84.

Id.at 165.

85.

Id. at 172-73. Section 503 of the Bankruptcy code allows for and governs
administrative expense claims. The United States Supreme Court in
Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968), establishedthat tort claims
are allowable administrative expense claims. See Newspapers, 690 F.3d at
173.

86.

Newspapers, 690 F.3d at 165.

87.

Id.at 165-66.

88.

Id.at 173.

89.

See id. at 173-74.

90.

Id.at 174.

91.

Id.(quoting Graham v. Today's Spirit, 468 A.2d 454, 457 (Pa. 1983)).

decision, Pennsylvania state courts had not yet had occasion to decide
"whether the single publication rule applies to Internet publication."92
Therefore, this court's task was to predict whether Pennsylvania
courts would apply the single publication rule in the context of
internet publications. The court began its inquiry by noting that
other courts to consider the question have applied the single
publication rule to internet publications.93 Following those other
courts and explaining that it saw no reason to distinguish between
print and digital publications on this issue, the court predicted that
Pennsylvania courts would apply the single publication rule to
internet publications.94
Nevertheless, hyperlinks could be considered an exception to the
rule if they were found to republish the material, thereby retriggering
the statute of limitations.95 Republication occurs, for instance, when a
second edition of a publication is issued or if a publication is reissued
with significant edits or alterations. 96 However, the court pointed out
that "under traditional principles of republication, a mere reference to
92.

Newspapers, 690 F.3d at 174.

93.

Id. For the general proposition that the single publication rule should
apply to the internet, the court cited the cases of Firth v. State, 706
N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 2000), aff'd 775 N.E.2d 463 (N.Y. Cit. App.
2002); Nationwide Bi-Weekly Admin., Inc. v. Belo Corp., 512 F.3d 137
(5th Cir. 2007); Oja v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 440 F.3d 1122 (9th
Cir. 2006). However, the court failed to mention that the first court to
have addressed the question actually ruled that the single publication
rule does not apply to the internet, see Swafford v. Memphis Individual
Practice Ass'n, 1998 WL 281935, No.02A01-9612-CV-0031 (June 2,
1998). For a law review article arguing that the single publication rule
should not apply to the internet, see Odelia Braun, Internet
Publications and Defamation: Why the Single Publication Rule Should
Not Apply, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 325, 332-37 (2002).

94.

Newspapers, 690 F.3d at 174.

95.

Id. The court noted that several other courts had already considered the
issue and found that hyperlinks do not constitute republication of the
original content, citing to Salyer v. Southern Poverty Law Center, Inc.,
701 F. Supp. 2d 912 (W.D. Ky. 2009); Sundance Image Tech., Inc. v.
Cone Editions Press, Ltd., No. 02-02258, 2007 WL 935703 (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 7, 2007); Churchill v. State of N.J., 876 A.2d 311 (N.J. Super. Ct.
2005).

96.

Id. See also SACK ON DEFAMATION §7:2.1, explaining that:

If a new edition of the work is published, however, even a new
edition of the same day's newspaper, a softcover edition of a
book originally published in hardcover, rebroadcast of a
television program, distribution of a DVD, with additional
material, of a theatrically released motion picture, or reprintings
of one edition of a book, it is ordinarily considered a new
publication upon which a separate cause of action may be based
and for which the statute of limitations begins to run again.

an article, regardless how favorable it is . . . does not republish the

material."97 The court went further by warning that if posting a
hyperlink was considered republication of the content that was linked
to, then the important policy objectives of the statute of limitations
would be defeated by allowing it to endlessly refresh.98 Satisfied that
the traditional single publication and republication rules deserved to
be applied in the digital era, the court plainly laid out the rule it was
adopting: "though a link and reference may bring readers' attention
to the existence of an article, they do not republish the article."99
Subsequently, the court applied this rule to the facts at hand. The
court reasoned that though the post-petition article made favourable
reference to the pre-petition content and encouraged users to visit the
Charter Page, the hyperlink did "not amount to the restatement or
alteration of the allegedly defamatory material," and therefore did not
constitute republication of it.' 0 Thus, by applying the traditional
American single publication rule to hyperlinks, the court held that a
hyperlink is not an adequate basis for the defamation claim.
B. Hyperlinks in Canada: Crookes v. Newton
Seven months prior to In Re: PhiladelphiaNewspapers, the SCC

had occasion to examine the question of whether a hyperlink should
be considered a publication of defamatory content. The case of
Crookes v. Newton'0 ' involved hyperlinks posted by website operator
Jon Newton to articles published on two other websites about the
plaintiff Wayne Crookes, an activist with the Green Party of
Canada. 102 After Newton refused Crookes' requests that the hyperlinks
be removed," 3 Crookes filed a defamation suit against Newton in
British Columbia alleging that Newton was liable for defamation
because the hyperlinks themselves published the defamatory
content.1 4 At both the trial court level and on appeal, Crookes'
defamation action was dismissed by findings that the hyperlinks did
not constitute publication. 05 Crookes appealed those decisions, leading
him to the Supreme Court.

97.

Id.

98.

Newspapers, 690 F.3d at 175.

99.

Id. (emphasis added).

100. Id.
101. [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 (Can.).
102. Id. at para. 4-8.

103. Id. at para. 9.
104. Id. at para. 10.
105. Id. at para. 11-12.

The majority opinion by Justice Abella °6 began by setting out the
standard for what constitutes publication in the context of
defamation: "a plaintiff must establish that the defendant has, by any
act, conveyed defamatory meaning to a single third party who had
received it.""07 However, Abella explained that the common law
"innocent dissemination" defence exempts from liability defendants
who merely play a passive role in the publication with no actual or
constructive knowledge of the defamatory content. 0
To further define the contours of the law of publication, the Court
cited with approval two American cases, Klein v. Biben and
MacFadden v. Anthony for the proposition that "referring to the
[original] article was neither a republication nor a publication of the
libel." °9 Justice Abella built off of those cases by noting that the lack
of control wielded by a hyperlinker over the content of the original
publication militates against finding a hyperlink to be a publication.
Abella repeatedly compared hyperlinks to references and footnotes in
traditional publications,' 10 arguing that the original content is outside
the control of the publisher of the reference."' Rather than holding
the poster of the hyperlink liable, Abella reasoned that "it is the
of the defamatory words" who should be held
actual creator or poster
12
liable for defamation.'
Thus, the Court held that "[m]aking reference to the existence
and/or location of content by hyperlink or otherwise, without more, is
not publication of that content.""' 3 However, if a hyperlinker repeats
106. Justice Abella's majority opinion was joined by Justices Binnie, Lebel,
Charron, Rothstein, and Cromwell. Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice
Fish filed a joint concurrence, and Justice Deschamps wrote separately
in a concurrence. See infra, note 113 for a comparative explanation of
these concurring opinions.
107. Id. at para. 16 (emphasis in original) (citing McNichol v. Grandy [1931]
S.C.R. 696, at p.699 (Can.)). The court quoted Brown, supra note 10, at
7.3 to illustrate the expansive range of conductthat could be considered
publication, including "dramatic pantomime," or drawing "someone's
attention... to a poster." Crookes, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 at para. 19.
108. Crookes, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 at para. 20.
109. Id. at para. 22-25.
110. See id. at para. 26, 27, 29, 30, 40.
111. Id. at para. 26.
112. Id.atpara. 29, 41.
113. Id. at para. 42. Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Fish wrote in a
joint concurrence to express their support for a slightly different
standard. According to those two justices, "[p]ublication of a defamatory
statement via a hyperlink should be found if the text indicates adoption
or endorsement of the content of the hyperlinked text." Id. at para. 48.
Justice Deschamps wrote separately, concurring in the result, but
arguing against the standard adopted by the Court. Deschamps would

the allegedly defamatory content, then the hyperlinker could be found
to have published it."' The Court explained that the protection given
to hyperlinkers "accords with a more sophisticated appreciation of
Charter values,""' 5 and is therefore consistent with its recent shift
toward more defendant-friendly
defamation jurisprudence that
occurred

through

WIC Radio and

Grant."6

The

Court

further

justified its holding by appealing to the "indispensable" role played by
hyperlinks in the functioning of the internet." 7 While recognizing the

danger to reputational interests

posed by hyperlinks and online

communications generally," 8 the Court was satisfied that the ability
to use hyperlinks was worth protecting.
Applying its newly formed rule to the situation presented by
Crookes, the Court reasoned that because "the use of a hyperlink
cannot, by itself, amount to publication even if the hyperlink is
followed and the defamatory content is accessed, Mr. Crookes's action
against Mr. Newton cannot succeed.""' 9 Thus,
Crookes was
attempting to hold Newton liable for content created by another
individual to which Newton merely referred via hyperlink. The
Court's holding here clearly established that hyperlinks do not publish

have the Court adopt a standard under which liability would be
imposed "[w]here a person deliberately makes defamatory information
readily available through the creation of a hyperlink." Id. at 101.
114. Crookes, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 at para. 42.
115. Id. at para. 33.
116. Id. at para. 32. While the Court writes that its opinion here accords
with the balance struck between reputational interests and freedom of
expression in Hill, id. at para. 31, the Court explicitly states its preCharter jurisprudence only "began to change when the Court modified
the 'honest belief' element to the fair comment defence in WIC Radio,
and when, in Grant, the Court developed a defence of responsible
communication on matters of public interest." Crookes, [2011] 3 S.C.R.
269 at para. 32.
117.

Crookes, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 at para. 34. The Court dedicates three
paragraphs to expounding on the importance of hyperlinks in ensuring
the free flow of information across the internet by citing to Matthew
Collins, The Law of Defamation and the Internet, 3 ed., para. 5.42
(2010); David Lindsay, Liability for the Publication of Defamatory
Material via the Internet, Research Paper No. 10. Melbourne: University
of Melbourne, Centre for Media, Communications and Information
Technology Law, 2000; Mark Sableman Link Law Revisited: Internet
Linking Law at Five Years, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1273, 1276 (2001);
Anjali Dala, Protecting Hyperlinks and Preserving First Amendment
Values on the Internet, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW. 1017, 1019, 1022

(2011).
118. Crookes, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 at para. 37-40.

119. Id. at para. 44.

the material to which they refer and therefore cannot form the basis
for a cause of action for defamation.
C. PreliminaryAssessment: A Seeming Similarity

Both Crookes and Newspapers stand for the general proposition
that hyperlinks cannot serve as the basis for the tort of defamation.

In Newspapers, the Inquirer was found not liable for posting a
hyperlink to allegedly defamatory content it had published in the
past. Similarly, in Crookes, Mr. Newton was found not liable for
posting hyperlinks to allegedly defamatory content created by third
parties.
While these holdings with regard to hyperlinks are facially similar,
the precise factual underpinnings do differ somewhat. In Newspapers,
the plaintiffs allegation of defamation was rooted in the defendant's
hyperlink to a prior article that was also written by the defendant.
Thus, the precise question there was whether a hyperlink constituted
a republication of content that had already been published by the
defendant. Comparatively, in Crookes, the plaintiff was attempting to
hold the defendant liable for hyperlinking to content created by
another author. As such, the precise question in Crookes was not
whether a hyperlink constituted republication of a defendant's already
published content. Rather, the Crookes court was considering whether a
defendant can be liable for hyperlinking to content that he did not
create. Despite these factual differences, the general premise emerging
from each case remains the same: a hyperlink is not an adequate basis
on which to hold a defendant liable for the publication of allegedly
defamatory content.
III. The Supreme Court of Canada's Use of American
Precedent: Revealing a Deeper Difference
As mentioned, the SCC referred with approval to two 2 ' American
cases, MacFadden v. Anthony 2' and Klein v. Biben 22 to buttress its
argument that "a simple reference - like a hyperlink - to defamatory

information"123 does not constitute publication or republication of the

120. Throughout the Crookes opinion, the SCC cited and discussed many
more than just two American cases, and also cited foreign cases,
statutes, and other authorities from other jurisdictions such as Britain
and Australia. However, this note will be focused on the divergence
between American and Canadian jurisprudence that is represented by
the utilization of these two cases.
121.

117 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct. 1952).

122. 69 N.E.2d 682 (N.Y. 1946).
123. Id. at para. 22.

content. 24 This section will discuss each of those cases in turn. The
SCC's usage of MacFadden seamlessly supports its holding in
Crookes, and thereby points to a similarity between American and
Canadian law. However, this section goes on to show that the citation
of Klein less directly supports the SCC's primary point in Crookes,
perhaps even undercutting one of its arguments. This factual
difference ultimately, as discussed in Section 5, results in the symbolic
power of Klein's presence in a SCC opinion.
A. MacFadden v. Anthony: A ConvincingAuthority
In MacFadden,125 a New York Supreme Court dismissed a
defamation suit against the American Broadcasting Company (ABC)
and its co-defendants that was rooted in remarks made over the air
by an ABC radio commentator. During a broadcast, the commentator
made reference to an article that had previously been published in
Collier's Magazine that
was allegedly defamatory
towards the
plaintiff. 26 The plaintiff did not claim that the commentator himself
said anything defamatory, nor was it alleged that the commentator
repeated any of the defamatory content. 127 Nevertheless, the plaintiff
argued that
the ABC commentator republished the allegedly
defamatory content "by calling his listeners' attention to this
magazine article, albeit without uttering any of the alleged
defamatory matter contained in said article."' 28 However, the court
held that merely referencing the article, without repeating its content,
29
does not constitute publication or republication of the content.
The factual basis and legal conclusion of MacFaddenare very
similar to those of Crookes, and the SCC's reliance on this case is
therefore quite appropriate. In both cases, a plaintiff was attempting
to hold the defendant liable for referencing allegedly defamatory
content created and published by a third party. The Collier's
magazine article 3 ' and the third party website articles about
Crookes' 3' were all created by individuals other than the defendant.
Just as the SCC in Crookes held that a hyperlink was merely a
reference which did not constitute a publication, 3 2 the MacFadden
124. Id. at para. 22-23.
125. 117 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct. 1952).

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.

131. Crookes, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 at para. 5-8.
132. Id.at para. 41.

court held that a reference that did not repeat defamatory content
was not a publication.'33
The manner in which MacFadden has been cited by U.S.
secondary literature confirms this similarity. For example, a New
York state treatise on defamation utilizes MacFadden to show that
"[a] mere reference to another writing which contains defamatory
matter does not, however, constitute an actionable repetition or
republication of the libelous matter."' 34 Indeed, such language is very
similar to the language used by the Crookes court to reach its
conclusion on hyperlinks.'35 Another treatise employed MacFadden to
stand for an American equivalent of the "innocent dissemination"
defence recognized by the SCC in Crookes,36 writing that "[a] person
who repeats defamatory
statements can be held liable, unless the
statements are repeated in such circumstances as to be justifiable and
innocent, as for example . . . a radio broadcast calling attention to a
libelous magazine article."' 37 For the SCC, MacFadden, though a U.S.
case, embodies a natural extension of traditional, pre-digital era
Canadian common law principles.'38 Thus, the SCC's reference to
MacFadden operates as an efficient augmentation of traditional
principles to adjust Canadian defamation law to the age of the
internet.'39
B. Klein v. Biben: A TroublingAuthority
However, a closer analysis of Klein v. Biben,"' the other case
cited by the SCC to make its point on republication, hints at an
apparent inconsistency in the SCC's holding and ultimately sheds
light on the stark contrast between Canada and the U.S. on the issue
of the single publication rule. In Klein, the Court of Appeals of New
York dismissed a plaintiffs defamation complaint against the
133. MacFadden, 117 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
134. Tracy Bateman Farrell, John Gebauer, Jeanne Philbin, and Susan L.
Thomas, 43A N.Y. JUR.2D DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY §85 (2012).
135. Crookes, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 at para. 42 ("Making reference to the
existence and/or location of content by hyperlink or otherwise, without
more, is not publication of that content.").
136. Id. at para. 20 (explaining that the "innocent dissemination" defence
"protects 'those who play a secondary role in the distribution system,
such as news agents, booksellers, and libraries.").
137. Lee S. Kreindler, Blanca I. Rodriguez, David Beekman, and David C.
Cook, 14 N.Y. Prac., New York Law of Torts §1:44 (2012).
138. Crookes, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 at para. 20-25.
139. Id. at para. 33 (conceptualizing the treatment given to hyperlinks as
"accord[ing] ... with the dramatic transformation in the technology of
communications.").
140. 69 N.E.2d 682 (N.Y. 1946).

publisher of The American Hebrew newspaper. 4 ' The newspaper had
initially published an allegedly defamatory article about the plaintiff
on May 12, 1944 (hereinafter 'May article').'42 Subsequently, on June
23, 1944, the same newspaper published another article (hereinafter
'June article') which referred to the May article without repeating its
allegedly defamatory
content. 43 The plaintiff was barred from
asserting a cause of action rooted in the May article because of the
statute of limitations, but the plaintiff also attempted to use the June
article as a basis for defamation. 4 4 However, the Klein court held that
the June article's reference to the May article, without repeating any
of its content, did not constitute a republication of the allegedly
defamatory article. 1"'
The factual pattern of Klein appears
to be more similar to
Newspapers than it is to Crookes and MacFadden. In Klein, the
plaintiff was attempting to hold the defendant newspaper liable for
referring to an article that had been previously published by the
defendant. 46 In that sense, the May article in Klein is analogous to
the Charter Page in Newspapers to which the post-petition article
referred. Whereas the defendants in Crookes and MacFaddenwere
alleged to have published content originally created by others, the
defendants in Klein and Newspapers were alleged to have republished
content that they themselves had created.
This factual difference between Crookes and Klein does not mean
that the SCC's reliance on Klein was misguided. However, it does
weaken the SCC's comparison of hyperlinks to ordinary references,
such as footnotes. As the SCC explains, "[r]eferencing on its own does
not involve exerting control over the content.' 1 47 However, in the case
of Klein, just as in Newspapers, the defendants did indeed at one
point exert control over the content: they created it. In comparing
hyperlinks to references, the SCC wrote that "inserting a hyperlink
gives the primary author no control over the content in the secondary
article to which he or she has linked."' 48 Again, in Klein and
Newspapers, the primary authors, as the creators of the secondary
articles, did indeed control the content in the secondary articles.
However, this seeming inconsistency does not do much to weaken the
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Klein, 69 N.E.2d at 682.

147. Crookes, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 at para. 26.
148. Id. at para. 27.

SCC's overall argument; the invocation of Klein for one principle,
that references do not republish content, does not mean that the
entirety of the Crookes holding must flow from the implications of
Klein.
IV. The SCC's reliance on Klein: Illustrating the
American-Canadian Divide
While it does not significantly undermine the SCC's holding, this
difference in factual underpinnings between Klein and Crookes is
what, despite the apparent similarity on hyperlinks, elucidates the
continuing jurisprudential divide between the two countries. This
section will demonstrate that in U.S. defamation jurisprudence, the
Klein ruling exemplifies the reach of the single publication rule. Thus,
the SCC's invocation of Klein to support its holding on references,
when viewed in light of Canada's rejection of the single publication
rule, emphasizes the extent to which Canadian and American
defamation jurisprudence continues to differ.
As stated concisely by the Third Circuit in Newspapers, under the
single publication rule, "it is the original printing of the defamatory
material and not the circulation of it which results in a cause of
action." 149 However, the republication of that defamatory material is
an exception to the single publication rule.150 In a New York state
treatise, Klein is utilized to show the limits of that exception, and
ipsofacto, the breadth of the single publication rule. 5' The treatise
recognizes that "each separate libelous article in a series constitutes a
different cause of action, and the publication of a subsequent article
does not constitute a republication of the prior libelous articles."'52
However, the treatise uses Klein to show that "[a] reference in a later
issue to an earlier libelous article, where there was no repetition of the
alleged libelous matter, did not constitute republication."' 53 Thus,
Klein reinforces the coverage of the single publication rule: the
reference in the June article to the May article is treated merely as
the circulation of the May article and therefore does not give rise to a
new cause of action.
Similarly, in Salyer v. Southern Poverty Law Center, Inc.,154 a
federal district court in Kentucky cited Klein for the principle that a
149. Newspapers, 690 F.3d at 174 (quoting Graham v. Today's Spirit, 468
A.2d 454, 457 (Pa. 1983)).
150. Id. at 174. See generally SACK
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reference does not constitute republication.'55 Just as the treatise did,
the court in Salyerutilized that principle from Klein to hold that a
reference should not constitute an exception to the single publication
"
rule. 56
'
In that fashion, the Salyer court ensured that the single
publication rule would protect defendants from the retriggering of the
statute of limitations by mere references.157
While Klein has been applied in the U.S. to reinforce the single
publication rule and was cited favourably by the SCC in Crookes,
Canadian jurisprudence continues to reject the single publication
"
rule. 58
' The decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in
Carter v. B.C. Fed'n of Foster Parents Ass'n "I exemplifies Canadian
courts' utilization of the multiple publication rule in lieu of the
American single publication rule. The Carter case presented two legal
issues to the court: (1) does the inclusion of a URL in a printed
newsletter constitute publication of the content found at that site?; 6 '
and (2) does the expiry of the two-year B.C. statute of limitations
since the time that plaintiff became aware of the online publication
bar the defamation action when the publication has remained
online?16'
The Carter court answered the first question in the negative by
citing both Klein and MacFadden.6 2 Indeed, this portion of the Carter
opinion is cited favourably in Crookes.163 In answering the second
question, the Carter court considered the adoption of the American
single publication rule, which would have the effect of barring the
cause of action. 64 The court characterized the single publication rule
,155. Id.at 916.
156. Id. (finding that "a reference, without more, is not properly a
republication."). The Salyer court also dealt with the question of
whether a hyperlink constituted a republication. The court held that a
hyperlink to an article did not republish the article, and therefore was
not an exception to the single publication rule so long as the original
content was not altered and the hyperlink itself did not repeat the
original content. Id. at 916-18. The court justified its holding by
appealing to the policy implications underlying the single publication
rule: "to find that a new link to an unchanged article posted long ago on
a website republishes that article would result in a continual retriggering
of the limitations period." Id.at 918.
157. Id.at 918.
158. See supra Section 2(iii).
159. 42 B.C.L.R. 4th 1 (Can. B.C. C.A.)
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.at para. 10-13.
Id. at para. 14.
Id.at para. 12-13.
Crookes, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 at para. 24-25.

164. Carter 42 B.C.L.R. 4th at para. 14.

as "an American rule of law (adopted in many but not all states)."'6 5
The court continued to write that "[a]lthough it is difficult to find an
express statement in the Canadian cases about the single publication
rule, the clear tendency of the authorities . . . is in favour of the
English and Australian [multiple publication rule] and not in favour of
'
As such, the court goes on to allow the
the American position."166
defamation action based on the continued existence of the online post
even though the statute of limitations would have expired had the
digital post been a print publication. 6' 7
By examining Carter, it becomes clear how a Canadian court
would rule on a case that presented facts that were truly analogous to
Klein and Newspapers in the internet age.' 68 Consider the hypothetical
example of a Canadian internet user that writes and posts an
allegedly defamatory article. This initial post is equivalent to the May
article in Klein. The same user then posts a hyperlink to that article
after the statute of limitations for actions arising from the article
expired. The hyperlink is equivalent to the June article that makes
reference to the May article in Klein. The holding of Crookes that
hyperlinks fail to constitute a republication of defamatory content
would seem to indicate that the hypothetical plaintiff, just like the
plaintiff in Klein, should be barred by the statute of limitations from
bringing a defamation action. However, Carter illustrates that
Canadian courts' adherence to the multiple publication rule would
allow the plaintiff to sue for defamation based on the original article
even if the statute of limitations running from the initial publication
of the article would have expired. Thus, while the hyperlink may not
constitute a republication of the article under Crookes, the original
article would nevertheless be susceptible to a defamation action under
Carter.
The ultimate implication of the Carter holding and this modemday Klein equivalent is that Canadian defamation defendants are
faced with an endlessly retriggering statute of limitations on their
internet publications. In contrast, American defendants can enjoy the
benefit of a limited time period in which defamation actions can be
165. Id. at para. 18.
166. Id.

167. Id. at para. 20.
168. The implication drawn from Carter, and reflected in the hypothetical,
that the single publication rule has been rejected in Canada is further
buttressed by the SCC's 2012 ruling in Breeden v. Black, 2012 SCC 19,
para. 20 (Can.) in which the court held that jurisdiction existed in
Ontario courts for a defamation cause of action arising from internet
content uploaded in the United States because "publication occurred
when the impugned statements were read, downloaded and republished
in Ontario." Id. at para. 20. In that sense, the SCC held that internet
content was republished every time it was accessed by a user.

brought against their online publications. Thus, while the SCC
utilized Klein to strengthen its argument that hyperlinks should not
constitute republications, a further examination of Klein reveals that
Canadian courts reject much of what it stands for.
Conclusion
This article began by highlighting the general differences between
the more plaintiff-friendly defamation jurisprudence in Canada and
the pro-speech jurisprudence in the U.S. The treatment of hyperlinks
in both countries though, in the recent cases of Newspapers and
Crookes, seemed to point to a similarity that emanated from the
SCC's recent shift in its defamation jurisprudence. However, this note
has demonstrated that the SCC's use of American case law in its
Crookes decision, while leading to a similar outcome on hyperlinks,
actually symbolizes the sharp divergence between the two countries
on the issue of the single publication rule.
The SCC invoked MacFadden and Klein to powerfully establish
that hyperlinks do not constitute publication for defamation purposes.
Yet, a further investigation as to the status of Klein in American
jurisprudence reveals that Canadian courts reject the cases that have
flowed from it. Further, as shown by the modem-Klein hypothetical,
Canadian courts would likely reach the opposite outcome of the Klein
court if the facts of Klein were presented today in the context of the
internet. In this fashion, the SCC's use of Klein serves as a reminder
of the drastic differences that remain between Canadian and
American defamation law.
In the future, Canadian defamation defendants, as did the
defendants in Carter, will likely attempt to push courts to adopt the
single publication rule for internet publications. Without the single
publication rule, any internet user who posts content online can be
held liable for defamation in Canada for as long as that content is
available online. Given the resistance of Canadian courts to adopt
anything resembling the single publication
rule, any future
convergence with the U.S. on the single publication rule may, as the
court in Carter suggested, ultimately depend on legislative action.

